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THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE:
FEALTY TO GOD OR CAESAR?
JOHN 0. HAYWARDt
Then Peter and the other apostles answered and said, "We
ought to obey God rather than men."1
Acts 5:29
INTRODUCTION
In The Clash of Civilizations,2 Samuel P. Huntington
describes "key institutions, practices, and beliefs that may
legitimately be identified as the core of Western civilization."3
' M.P.A., Harvard University; J.D. & A.B., Boston University; Adjunct Senior
Lecturer, Bentley University, Waltham, Massachusetts. The author may be reached
at jhayward@bentley.edu.
1 According to Biblical interpretation, "Peter is not sanctioning civil
disobedience." Acts 5:29 cmt. (King James Study), at 1671. On the contrary, civil
government is to be obeyed. However, when it goes contrary to the explicit
commands of God, religious adherents must obey God and be ready to suffer the
consequences. See Acts 5:29 (King James Study), at 1671. Thus, the early Christians
suffered persecution because they refused to worship the imperial gods of Rome, a
practice they regarded as idolatry. See RUSSELL BLACKFORD, FREEDOM OF RELIGION
& THE SECULAR STATE 22 (2012). Martin Luther took this principle of obedience to
God over Caesar one step further by emphasizing the supremacy of personal
religious conscience over the dictates of the state, at that time represented by the
Catholic Church. His famous words, "Here I stand," allegedly spoken at the diet of
Worms in the course of being questioned by church authorities to answer for his
heretical theological views, ushered in a renewed era of religious conscience in
opposition to government. See ERIK H. ERIKSON, YOUNG MAN LUTHER: A STUDY IN
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND HISTORY 231 (1993). The year was 1521. HENRY S. LUCAS,
THE RENAISSANCE AND THE REFORMATION 472 (2d. ed. 1964). Thus, Luther set the
modern precedent for the opposition of religious conscience to the commands of the
state, a struggle which the Founding Fathers hoped the First Amendment's Free
Exercise Clause would obviate. Unfortunately, that has not been the case. For an
analysis of contemporary American religious cultural wars, see generally MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA'S TRADITION OF
RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2010) (discussing the battles over school prayer and creche
displays under the Establishment Clause, evolution and creationism, gay marriage,
and fear of Muslims).
2 SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF
WORLD ORDER (1996).
3 Id. at 69.
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Included in his list is the "Es]eparation of spiritual and temporal
authority."4 When the Founding Fathers set about drafting a
document to serve as the basis for the Republic, they were in
agreement that the issues of religion were "outside of the sphere
of civil government"5 and so enacted as part of the First
Amendment that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."6 This Article furnishes a modest definition of "religion,"
briefly reviews the historical background of the Free Exercise
Clause, examines several significant U.S. Supreme Court
decisions, including the controversial Hobby Lobby case,7 that
have defined, expanded, and limited this clause, and finally,
argues that the High Court, in interpreting the Free Exercise
clause, should be mindful of the writings of seventeenth century
political philosopher John Locke (1632-1704), who maintained
that the state should allow all religions to pursue their own goals
as long as they do not produce civil harms.' Lastly, this Article
posits a caveat that a country whose citizens have no religion or
any sense of connectedness to some higher purpose is an
impoverished nation that cannot long endure, and a government
that disparages religion is unwittingly contributing to its own
demise.
4 Id. at 70 (emphasis omitted). Also included are the Classical legacy,
Catholicism and Protestantism, European languages, rule of law, social pluralism,
representative bodies, and individualism. Id. at 69-71 (emphasis omitted).
' Scott E. Thompson, Note, The Demise of Free Exercise: An Historical Analysis
of Where We Are, and How We Got There, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 169, 169 (1999).
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
I Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). A congressional
attempt to reverse the Court's ruling failed. See Kristina Peterson, Democrats Fail
in Move To Negate Hobby Lobby Ruling, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2014, at A4. For an
argument that employers should be legally required to pay for all types of
contraception irrespective of their religious convictions, see Alan Garfield, Making
the Case for Contraception over Religious Views, NEWS J., Mar. 24, 2014, at A09.
8 JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (James H. Tully ed.,
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1983) (1689); see BLACKFORD, supra note 1, at 46.
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I. WHAT IS "RELIGION"?
A. Definitional Difficulties9
Defining "religion" is no easy matter. The word derives from
the Latin religare-"to bind fast."1" Of course, one can always
use the dictionary definition,11 but its utility is rather limited
when deciding free exercise cases. To give the reader a proper
understanding of the profound implications of the concept, it is
worthwhile to recall the comments of a respected authority on
the subject:
All religions imply in one way or another that human beings do
not, and cannot, stand alone, that they are vitally related with
and even dependent on powers in nature and society external to
themselves. Dimly or clearly, they know that they are not
independent centers of force capable of standing apart from the
world.12
Although belief in God in the higher religions has sometimes led
many believers to think meanly of the world around them, in
the faith that they are pilgrims and strangers here on earth and
that heaven is their home, this belief is far from typical. The
general attitude is that the relation between human beings and
their world is organic and vital, not accidental and external. If
the outer face of nature is sometimes mistrusted, it is usually in
the name of something deeper within that is assigned a higher
degree of reality.13
As these excerpts illustrate, the existence of God or a
Supernatural Being is not a requirement for a religion as the
U.S. Supreme Court in Torcaso v. Watkins 4 acknowledged,
thereby seemingly repudiating Chief Justice Hughes in United
9 This section originally appeared in John 0. Hayward, Religious Pretenders in
the Courts: Unmasking the Imposters, 20 TRINITY L. REV. 24 (2014).
10 WILLIAM L. REESE, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION: EASTERN AND
WESTERN THOUGHT 647 (expanded ed. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 702 (5th ed. 2012) (defining "religion"
as the expression of man's "[blelief in and reverence for a supernatural power or
powers regarded as creator or governor of the universe.").
12 DAVID S. NOSS & JOHN B. NOSS, MAN'S RELIGIONS 2 (7th ed. 1984).
13 Id.
14 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). For a recent discussion of the Court's adjudication of
Establishment Clause cases in the context of different religious perspectives,
including religious majorities, minorities, and nonbelievers, see Samuel J. Levine, A
Look at the Establishment Clause Through the Prism of Religious Perspectives:
Religious Majorities, Religious Minorities, and Nonbelievers, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
775, 781-82 (2012).
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States v. MacIntosh." It has been argued that courts should not
define religion and that any attempt to do so could violate
religious freedom because it would dictate to religions what they
must be.' 6 On the other hand, it has also been said that failing to
define religion could violate the principle of the Free Exercise
Clause. 7  Nonetheless, the plain language of the First
Amendment requires a definition of "religion" specific enough to
allow courts to distinguish between religious belief and non-
religious belief.'8 But as Chief Justice Burger said in Thomas v.
Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division,9
"The determination of what is a 'religious' belief or practice is
more often than not a difficult and delicate task.... 2
While definitions of religion vary, it is recognized that a
common thread uniting all belief systems that can be termed
"religious" is that they are in some way connected with "'the
eternal', whether this is understood as an eternal Being outside
man-God, or as the eternity of man's own being-
immortality."2 ' Again, it is possible for a religion to be godless, as
in the case of early Buddhism, which recognizes neither God nor
Absolute, yet is nonetheless a religion and is acknowledged as
such.22 In all religions there are, "in different proportions, three
main ingredients-faith, a desire to 'belong' and a desire for
escape'. "13
Faith-This
means either belief in the 'mission' of a certain individual or
group-prophet, incarnate god or church-or assent to a
15 283 U.S. 605, 634 (1931). "The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation." Id. at 633-34.
16 See Jonathan Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: "Religion" in the Law,
73 YALE L.J. 593, 604 (1964); see also Ben Clements, Note, Defining "Religion" in the
First Amendment: A Functional Approach, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 532, 532 n.6 (1989).
17 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6, at 1180 (3d ed.
2000).
18 Clements, supra note 16, at 533.
19 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
20 Id. at 714.
21 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 393 (R.C. Zaehner ed., 1988).
22 Id.
23 Id.; see also Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment,
1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 580 (1982); James M. Donovan, God Is as God Does: Law,
Anthropology, and the Definition of "Religion," 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 23, 32, 34
(1995). On the related topic of what is a church, see Mason Powell, Note, Ecclesia
Semper Reformanda Est. Radical Reformation and the IRS, 101 KY. L.J. 207, 208
(2012).
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particular interpretation of existence, which enjoys the
authority of antiquity or of human sages of proved experience.
Faith in a personal god expresses itself in practical worship;
faith in a given interpretation of existence finds its practical
application in the schooling of mind and body in an effort to
realise [sic] the spiritual state which this interpretation of
existence claims is man's spiritual goal.24
Desire to 'belong'--While this is not a specifically religious
phenomenon,
it is present, to a greater or lesser degree, in all religions. It
may manifest itself in all kinds of ways. At its simplest it is the
desire to be incorporated into a spiritual society and to become
integrated within it, as a part of the body is in the body itself.
Alternatively, as in nature mysticism, it may express itself as a
merging in the 'all'. In its extreme form, . . . this merging in the
'all' is transcended, and the individual, by the mere act of
casting off individuality, becomes, or believes he becomes,
identical with the 'all'.... 2
Desire to 'escape'-While present in all religions,
[i]t is on the matter of that from which release is sought that
religions so profoundly disagree. The Christian seeks release
from the bondage of sin; the Buddhist seeks release from human
existence as such. Islam, on the other hand, which accepts this
world as God's creation and field of operation, was nevertheless
unable wholly to resist the pressure of its own mystics who
turned their backs on this world entirely.
26
One commentator, writing mainly of the Abrahamic
traditions of the West, but with perceptive comparisons to
Buddhism, explains religion in terms of belief in an agency or
power that transcends the immanent order-by which he means
the operations of the natural world.27 For this observer, religion
relates to "the beyond," to an otherworldly order of things, but
not in just any way.2" He posits three specific dimensions:
First, religion asserts that there is some higher good or
ultimate end beyond ordinary human flourishing. Second, it
includes the possibility of personal transformation, to ensure
24 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS, supra note 21.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 393-94.
27 BLACKFORD, supra note 1, at 6 (citing CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE 15
(2007)).
28 Id.
2014]
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that the higher good is achieved. This, in turn, involves the
existence of a transformative and transcendent power. Third,
the religious account of our possible transformation involves a
sense of human life extending beyond "this life."29
In summary, this furnishes us a useful framework to
interpret religious beliefs for free exercise cases. Namely, an
otherworldly order of things and an otherworldly dimension to
human lives, an ultimate good that transcends worldly kinds of
flourishing, the possibility of spiritual transformation, and the
existence of transcendent and transformative powers.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Virginia Statute for Establishing Religious Freedom and Its
Progeny
The religious liberties embedded in the First Amendment
had their beginnings in the struggle to separate church and
state.3 0  Author Anson Phelps Stokes documents this
development when he writes, "[T]he study of American history
shows that this actual separation, especially in the states, was
generally the precursor, and always the surest support of public
opinion in guaranteeing freedom of conscience and worship. 31
Drafted by Thomas Jefferson, and shepherded into Virginia law
by James Madison," the Virginia statute of 1786 declared:
No man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious
worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced,
restrained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, nor
shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or
belief; but all men shall be free to profess and by argument to
maintain their opinion in matters of religion, and the same
shall in nowise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil
capacities.3
29 Id. (footnote omitted) (citing TAYLOR, supra note 27, at 20).
30 2 Louis FISHER & KATY J. HARRIGER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 566
(10th ed. 2013).
31 1 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 646
(1950).
32 FISHER & HARRIGER, supra note 30.
33 VA. CONST. art. I, § 16 (quoted in BRUCE T. MURRAY, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN
AMERICA: THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE
11 (2008)).
FEALTY TO GOD OR CAESAR?
Both Jefferson and Madison viewed religion and its free
exercise as a fundamental human right forever free from state
intrusion 34-shades of Martin Luther! At the time, Virginia
forced Baptists, Presbyterians, Catholics, Quakers, and other
minority groups to support its established Anglican Church,35 but
Madison "believed religion functioned best when it was not
dependent on the state for its existence or support."36 Jefferson
was in agreement with Madison that religious matters were
beyond the scope of civil government," declaring his views in his
second inaugural address:
In matters of religion I have considered that its free exercise is
placed by the Constitution independent of the powers of the
General Government. I have therefore undertaken on no
occasion to prescribe the religious exercise suited to them, but
have left them, as the Constitution found them, under the
direction and discipline of the church or state authorities
acknowledged by the several religious societies.
38
Earlier, in 1776, Virginia statesman George Mason had
drafted the landmark Virginia Declaration of Rights, which
stated, "[A]ll men should enjoy the fullest toleration in the
exercise of religion according to the dictates of conscience.
39
Thirteen years later, when the time came for writing the First
Amendment, Madison's initial draft read as follows: "The civil
rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or
worship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall
the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on
any pretext, infringed."40 Two words that appeared in Mason's
Declaration of Rights were conspicuously absent from Madison's
draft, namely "toleration" and "conscience."4 The exact reason
for deleting "conscience" is unknown, but perhaps it was too
34 FISHER & HARRIGER, supra note 30.
35 Id.
31 Thompson, supra note 5 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing JOHN
EIDSMOE, CHRISTIANITY AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE FAITH OF OUR FOUNDING
FATHERS 106 (1987)).
37 Id.
38 Id. (citing EIDSMOE, supra note 36, at 243).
31 MURRAY, supra note 33, at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
4 (1986)).
40 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing MILLER, supra note 39, at 121).
41 Id.
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broad a concept to codify,42 although the Supreme Court has said
that the First Amendment "was adopted to curtail the power of
Congress to interfere with the individual's freedom to believe, to
worship, and to express himself in accordance with the dictates of
his own conscience. On the other hand, the justification for
removing "tolerance" is known. Madison believed that toleration
implied condescension from some institution or belief in the
superior position to do the tolerating. His amendment "removed
freedom of religion from the purview of what lawyers today call
'legislative grace'-with the implicit assumption that what is
thus given can be withdrawn by the power that grants it." 4
In 1988, the Williamsburg Charter, marking the
bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution and Virginia's call for a Bill
of Rights, sought to reaffirm the principles of the First
Amendment and define the meaning of the Religious Liberty
Clauses." It determined that at the heart of the Free Exercise
Clause is the prohibition that the State may not interfere with
religious liberty.46  While theoretically the principle seems
unambiguous and straightforward, in practice it has proven to be
complex, unpredictable, and constantly in flux. We now turn to
the Supreme Court's chameleonic interpretations of this clause.
III. FREE EXERCISE IN THE COURTS
A. Reynolds: When Religion Requires Polygamy
One commentator has pointed out that for one hundred years
after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, only six cases that had
any substantial reference to free exercise of religion reached the
Supreme Court 47 :
42 Id. (citing MILLER, supra note 39, at 122 ("If 'conscience' should be taken, as
we do today, to mean not only belief but also principled moral conviction, and not
only religious but also nonreligious belief and conviction, then Madison's proposal
would have been an 'advance' (if you regard the direction as forward) over even what
twentieth-century courts have come to hold.")).
43 Id. (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49 (1985)) (internal quotation
mark omitted).
14 Id. at 13-14 (quoting MILLER, supra note 39, at 6) (internal quotation mark
omitted).
45 Id. at 15.
46 Id.
47 Thompson, supra note 5, at 172 & n.17 (citing Late Corp. of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890); Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878); Watson
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Of those six cases, two involved church property,48 one involved
a municipal restriction on where funerals could be performed,49
and three involved adherents to the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints (Mormons). One Mormon case dealt with
church property being confiscated because the church continued
to teach the doctrine of bigamy in violation of state law and was
not in compliance with state regulations regarding property
holdings by religious societies.5 °  The two principal cases
involved Mormons violating criminal laws and excepting to the
charges because their religion directed their disobedience. 1
Only these two cases were decided on grounds that addressed
an individual's freedom of conscience or action.
52
In 1878, the Supreme Court decided Reynolds v. United
States, as the first case in which religious doctrine ran headlong
into the proscriptions of the criminal law.53 Reynolds, a member
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (Mormons)
was arrested and charged with polygamy, which violated the
territorial law of Utah. 54  Among Reynolds's defenses was the
claim that he was acting in accordance with the dictates of his
religion and that the territorial law infringed upon his free
exercise rights.
v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871); Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New
Orleans, 44 U.S. 589 (1845); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. 43 (1815)).
' Id. at 172 (footnote omitted) (citing Terrett, 13 U.S. at 43-44 (involving land
held by the incorporated Episcopal church prior to and after the revolution); Watson,
80 U.S. at 679 (involving a dispute over which group in a church split was entitled to
land)).
" Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Permoli, 44 U.S. at 590).
50 Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Late Corp. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, 136 U.S. at 6, 10).
51 Id. (footnote omitted) (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 145; Davis, 133 U.S. at 333).
52 Id. (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162; Davis, 133 U.S. at 348).
5 98 U.S. 145.
5 Id. at 150-51 (explaining that Reynolds was sentenced to two years at hard
labor and ordered to pay a fine of $500).
55 Id. at 161 (explaining that Reynolds argued before the District Court "that it
was the duty of male members of said church, circumstances permitting, to practise
polygamy; ... that this duty was enjoined by different books which the members of
said church believed to be of divine origin, and among others the Holy Bible, and
also that the members of the church believed that the practice of polygamy was
directly enjoined upon the male members thereof by the Almighty God, in a
revelation to Joseph Smith, the founder and prophet of said church; that the failing
or refusing to practise polygamy by such male members of said church, when
circumstances would admit, would be punished, and that the penalty for such failure
and refusal would be damnation in the life to come." (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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The Court noted that "religion" is not defined anywhere in
the U.S. Constitution, and so it must inquire into "the history of
the times in the midst of which the provision was adopted."56 It
reviewed the development of the amendment and concluded by
citing Thomas Jefferson's well-known letter to the Danbury
Baptist Association in 1802:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man and his God; that he owes account to none other
for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the
government reach actions only, and not opinions,-I
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole
American people which declared that their legislature should
'make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of
separation between church and State."
Since this emanated from the "acknowledged leader of the
advocates of the measure," the Justices accepted it as
authoritative, and concluded that "Congress was deprived of all
legislative power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach
actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of
good order."" The Court declared that "[p]olygamy has always
been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe,
and, until the establishment of the Mormon Church, was almost
exclusively a feature of the life of Asiatic and of African people."59
56 Id. at 162.
11 Id. at 164.
58 Id.
59 Id. Actually, polygamy "is taken for granted in the Bible, even though the
account of creation (Gen. 1:27; 2:18-24) indicates that monogamy was the original
state envisaged by the Creator." THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE JEWISH RELIGION 305
(R.J. Zwi Werblowsky & Geoffrey Wigoder eds., 1966). "In spite of frequent instances
of p[olygamy] (the first being Lamech, Gen. 4:19, and the most outstanding being
Solomon, I Kings 11:3), monogamy appears to have been the rule, polygamy the
exception. . . ." Id. The Ten Commandments is silent about the number of wives a
man may have, and at the time of the writing of Exodus (1450-1400 B.C.E.) and
Deuteronomy (1410-1395 B.C.E.), polygamy was accepted and practiced by Judaism
and surrounding cultures. DARREL W. RAY, SEX & GOD: HOW RELIGION DISTORTS
SEXUALITY 57 (Deborah Shouse & Kirsten McBride eds., 2012). Ray points out that
the influential Rabbi Gershom ben Judah (c. 960- 1040) "put the nail in the
polygamy coffin" with his many rules and laws. Id. at 57 n.32. Of course, Islam
explicitly sanctions polygamy. "If you fear you cannot treat orphans with fairness,
then you may marry other women who seem good to you: two, three, or four of
them." THE KORAN 60 (N.J. Dawood trans., 5th rev. ed. 1990) (footnote omitted). At
present, nearly fifty countries recognize polygamy under their civil law. See Legal
Status of Polygamy, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal status of
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The Court then briefly discussed the substantial legal precedent
that criminalizes polygamy, declaring:
[Ilt may safely be said there never has been a time in any State
of the Union when polygamy has not been an offence [sic]
against society, cognizable by the civil courts and punishable
with more or less severity. In the face of all this evidence, it is
impossible to believe that the constitutional guaranty of
religious freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect
to this most important feature of social life. 60
The Court stated that given the legislature's authority to
outlaw polygamy, then
the only question which remains is, whether those who make
polygamy a part of their religion are excepted from the
operation of the statute. If they are, then those who do not
make polygamy a part of their religious belief may be found
guilty and punished, while those who do, must be acquitted and
go free.61
Remarking that this would introduce a new element into
criminal law, the Justices declared that while the law may not
interfere with religious beliefs or opinions, it may prohibit
actions-using as dramatic examples a religious practice that
required human sacrifice, 2 or a widow burning herself upon her
husband's funeral pyre. In any event, the Court announced it
could not be seriously argued that the free exercise of religion
allowed such practices, 4 otherwise, "[t]o permit this would be to
make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the
polygamy#Countries-that recognize-polygamous-marriages (last modified Apr. 29,
2015). On monogamy being observed more in the breach than the practice, see
generally DAVID P. BARASH & JUDITH EVE LIPTION, THE MYTH OF MONOGAMY:
FIDELITY AND INFIDELITY IN ANIMALS AND PEOPLE (Owl Books 2002) (2001)
(discussing fidelity and infidelity in animals and people). The potent combination of
sex and religion is ably dealt with in Geoffrey Parrinder's Sexual Morality in the
World's Religions, which explores these topics within the historical and
contemporary context of each of the world's major living religions, including the
influences of medicine, psychology, and women's rights. See generally GEOFFREY
PARRINDER, SEXUAL MORALITY IN THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS (2003).
60 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165.
61 Id. at 166.
62 Id. Perhaps the Court has in mind worship of the god Baal, whose followers
practiced human sacrifice. See Werblowsky & Wigoder, supra note 59, at 53.
63 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166. The Court is referring to the now outlawed Hindu
practice of suttee that was common in India for many years. See generally EDWARD
THOMPSON, SUTTEE: A HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO THE HINDU
RITE OF WIDOW-BURNING (1928).
64 Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166-67.
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law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a
law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under
such circumstances."
65
The Free Exercise Clause was again unsuccessful as a
defense to polygamy in Davis v. Beason,66 in which the U.S.
Supreme Court remarked that:
Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by the laws of all civilized and
Christian countries. They are crimes by the laws of the United
States, and they are crimes by the laws of Idaho. They tend to
destroy the purity of the marriage relation, to disturb the peace
of families, to degrade woman, and to debase man. Few crimes
are more pernicious to the best interests of society, and receive
more general or more deserved punishment. To extend
exemption from punishment for such crimes would be to shock
the moral judgment of the community. To call their advocacy a
tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of mankind.67
Commenting on the purpose of the Free Exercise Clause, the
Court declared that "[ilt was never intended or supposed that the
amendment could be invoked as a protection against legislation
for the punishment of acts inimical to the peace, good order, and
morals of society."6" As in Reynolds, the Court paraded out a list
of heinous practices that would not be tolerated under the Free
Exercise Clause: human sacrifice, "promiscuous intercourse of
the sexes, as prompted by the passions of its members," and the
abolition of marriage.69 Finally, laying to rest any notion that
religion can trump criminal law, the Justices pronounced:
[N]ever before in the history of this country has it been
seriously contended that the whole punitive power of the
government for acts, recognized by the general consent of the
Christian world in modern times as proper matters for
' Id. at 167. Justice Scalia would cite this very phrase 112 years later in
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (upholding a state statute
criminalizing the use of peyote against a free exercise of religion challenge brought
by Native Americans who used it as a sacrament in their religious practices). See
infra Part IV.F.
133 U.S. 333, 341-43 (1890).
67 Id. at 341-42.
68 Id. at 342.
9 Id. at 343. Perhaps the Court has in mind the "Free Love" movement of the
late nineteenth century, which sought to remove the state from matters of marriage,
birth control, and adultery. See generally JOHN C. SPURLOCK, FREE LOVE: MARRIAGE
AND MIDDLE-CLASS RADIcALISM IN AMERICA, 1825-1860 (1988). See also Free Love,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free-love (last modified Apr. 15, 2015).
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prohibitory legislation, must be suspended in order that the
tenets of a religious sect encouraging crime may be carried out
without hindrance. 70
Thus, as the nation entered the twentieth century, the
Supreme Court made it crystal clear that religious practices
"inimical to the peace, good order, and morals of society"'" would
not be sanctioned by cloaking them with the mantle of religious
practice or custom. However, the new century would find
religious adherents before the Court not to argue for plural
marriages, but rather for freedom to proselytize,72 avoid saluting
the American flag,73 observe their Sabbath without loss of
unemployment benefits," keep their children home from public
school,7 5 and use hallucinogenic drugs as part of their religious
activities.76 It is to these cases we now turn.
B. Cantwell: Invalidating Licensing Requirements for Religious
Solicitation
The sixty years from 1891 to 1950 saw little activity
regarding the Free Exercise Clause,77 perhaps due to the
government's very limited involvement in the lives of its
citizens.78 One case, Holy Trinity Church v. United States,7 9
involving a congressional ban on importing aliens into the United
States to perform labor or service of any kind, is perhaps best
known for Associate Justice Brewer's comment that "this is a
Christian nation." °8 During this period, "a number of cases with
70 Beason, 133 U.S. at 343.
71 Id. at 342.
72 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1940).
13 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940)).
14 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
75 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
76 Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
17 Thompson, supra note 5, at 175.
78 See BLACKFORD, supra note 1, at 141 (commenting that in earlier times,
specifically at the time John Locke was writing, that is, the late seventeenth
century, the state was a "relatively modest.., apparatus").
79 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
80 Id. at 471. Justice Brewer went on to elaborate his view in DAVID J. BREWER,
THE UNITED STATES A CHRISTIAN NATION (1905). While this decision was not a
binding legal pronouncement reflecting an official acceptance of Christianity and did
not say that its laws or policies should reflect solely Christian concerns and beliefs,
he did outline the influence Christianity had on the history and culture of the
United States. See David Josiah Brewer, WIKIPEDIA, http:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
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some bearing on the free exercise of religion came before the
Supreme Court.""l Of these cases, ten concerned municipal
ordinances which were challenged by adherents of the Jehovah's
Witnesses sect. 2 These cases challenged state or municipal
ordinances that required a license to distribute or sell
literature.8 3  Perhaps the most well-known is Cantwell v.
Connecticut.4 At issue in Cantwell was a Connecticut law that
forbade the solicitation of money for any religious or charitable
purpose without the approval of the Secretary of Public
Welfare." Newton Cantwell and his two sons, Jesse and Russell,
were Jehovah's Witnesses claiming to be ordained ministers.8 6
They were arrested in New Haven, Connecticut, and charged
with various statutory and common law offenses including
breach of the peace, s' and a state statute that provided the
following:
'No person shall solicit money, services, subscriptions or any
valuable thing for any alleged religious, charitable or
philanthropic cause, from other than a member of the
organization for whose benefit such person is soliciting or
within the county in which such person or organization is
located unless such cause shall have been approved by the
secretary of the public welfare council. Upon application of any
person in behalf of such cause, the secretary shall determine
DavidJosiahBrewer (last modified May 4, 2015). Some commentators have
expressed concern over his statement. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF
DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 83-
101 (1993).
8' Thompson, supra note 5, at 176; see also id. at 176 n.47 (collecting cases). The
"more significant" cases are: Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Tucker
v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944); Follett v.
Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158
(1944); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943);
Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (Jones II); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S.
413 (1943); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Jones v. City of
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942) (Jones /); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938); Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934); Quick
Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908).
82 Thompson, supra note 5, at 176.
83 Id. at 177.
84 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
85 Id. at 301-02.
' Id. at 300.
87 Id.
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whether such cause is a religious one or is a bona fide object of
charity or philanthropy and conforms to reasonable standards of
efficiency and integrity, and, if he shall so find, shall approve
the same and issue to the authority in charge a certificate to
that effect. Such certificate may be revoked at any time. Any
person violating any provision of this section shall be fined not
more than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than
thirty days or both.'8
Cantwell and his sons "claimed that their activities were not
within the statute but consisted only of distribution of books,
pamphlets, and periodicals. 8 9  The State Supreme Court held
that "in addition to the sale of the books and the distribution of
the pamphlets[,] the defendants were also soliciting contributions
or donations of money for an alleged religious cause, and thereby
came within the purview of the statute."9" The State Court
stated that it was the solicitation that brought the appellants
within the sweep of the Act, and not their other activities in the
dissemination of literature.9
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Cantwells'
conviction was overturned. The High Court held that
Connecticut's statute deprived appellants of their liberty without
due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth
Amendment, whose fundamental concept of liberty embraces the
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.92 The Court ruled
that while freedom of conscience and religious belief are absolute,
the freedom to act in the exercise of religion is subject to
regulation for the protection of society, though such regulation
88 Id. at 301-02. Note that the statute requires the secretary of the public
welfare council to determine what is a religious cause. In effect, this entails defining
what is a "religion" for purposes of the statute, quite a daunting task. As to how
courts have wrestled with this challenge, see supra Part II.
89 Id. at 302.
90 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing State v. Cantwell, 8 A.2d 533,
535-36 (1939)).
91 "It declared the legislation constitutional as an effort by the State to protect
the public against fraud and imposition in the solicitation of funds for what
purported to be religious, charitable, or philanthropic causes." Id. For a fascinating
case involving a similar statutory prohibition on religious solicitation, see
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430 (2d Cir.
1981), in which the court protected the right of the religious group Hare Krishna to
solicit funds at a state fair.
92 Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303 (citing Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160
(1939)).
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must not unduly infringe the protected freedom." Although the
State could not deny the right to preach or to disseminate
religious views, clearly it could regulate the time, place, and
manner of street solicitation in a non-discriminatory manner in
order to "safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the
community."94
The Justices also decided that the statute's requirement that
the secretary of the public welfare council could withhold a
licensing certificate if the secretary found that the cause was not
religious, and that to solicit without a license was a crime,
constituted censorship of religion.95 Thus the secretary could
determine whether a religion survived. Such a situation, the
Court opined, was a denial of the liberty protected by the First
Amendment and included in the protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment.96 Accordingly, the Free Exercise Clause allowed the
Cantwells to solicit and proselytize for their religious views
without the need for obtaining a certificate or license from a state
official, certainly a far cry from invoking it to engage in
polygamy.
Next, this Article examines whether the Free Exercise
Clause allowed one to avoid saluting the American flag 7 on the
ground that doing so constituted idolatry in contravention of
biblical proscriptions.98
C. The Flag Salute Cases: Gobitis & Barnette
In June 1940, with World War II raging and Nazi Germany
marching inexorably across Europe, it seemed unthinkable that
any American citizen would refuse to salute the American flag.
But some Jehovah's Witnesses declined to do just that. They
maintained it violated their religious beliefs. 99
93 Id. at 303-04.
94 Id. at 304.
91 Id. at 305.
96 Id.
9' See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), rev'g
Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
98 See Exodus 20:4 (King James Study Bible) ("Thou shalt not make unto thee
any graven image...."); id. at 20:5 ("Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor
serve them .... ).
99 Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 591-92.
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Lillian Gobitis, aged twelve, and her brother William, aged
ten, were expelled from the public schools of Minersville,
Pennsylvania, for refusing to salute the national flag as part of a
daily school exercise. The local board of education required both
teachers and pupils to participate in this ceremony, which was
mandated by a state regulation requiring that pupils in the
public schools, on pain of expulsion, participate in a daily
ceremony of saluting the national flag while reciting in unison a
pledge of allegiance to it "and to the Republic for which it stands;
one nation indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."100 In 1937,
a federal district judge in Pennsylvania ruled this statute
unconstitutional. 101 The judged reasoned that "[i]f someone on
the basis of sincere religious beliefs defied a statute, the
individual's rights would prevail unless the state demonstrated
that the statute was necessary for the public safety, health,
morals, property, or personal rights."' °2 Drawing on the heritage
of the state, he commented:
We may well recall that William Penn, the founder of
Pennsylvania, was expelled from Oxford University for his
refusal for conscience'[s] sake to comply with regulations not
essentially dissimilar, and suffered, more than once,
imprisonment in England because of his religious convictions.
The commonwealth he founded was intended as a haven for all
those persecuted for conscience'[s] sake.10 3
This judgment was supported by another decision from the
same judge, 0 4 and a federal appellate court,' ° although similar
compulsory flag salute laws survived several court challenges. 0 6
Justice Frankfurter, writing for an eight-to-one majority, ruled
that religious convictions did not relieve the individual from
obedience to an otherwise valid general law not aimed at the
1 Id. at 591 (internal quotation mark omitted).
,o' Gobitis v. Minersville Sch. Dist., 21 F. Supp. 581, 584 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
102 FISHER & HARRIGER, supra note 30, at 573.
103 Gobitis, 21 F. Supp. at 585.
'0o See Gobitis v. Minersville Sch. Dist., 24 F. Supp. 271 (1938).
105 See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 108 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1939).
106 See FISHER & HARRIGER, supra note 30, at 573; see also id. at 573 n.4
(collecting cases). The cases are: Leoles v. Landers, 192 S.E. 218 (Ga. 1937), affd,
302 U.S. 656 (1937); Hering v. State Bd. of Ed., 189 A. 629 (N.J. 1937), affd, 194 A.
177 (N.J. 1937), appeal dismissed, 303 U.S. 624 (1938); Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker,
82 P.2d 391 (Cal. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 621 (1939); Johnson v. Town of
Deerfield, 25 F. Supp. 918 (D. Mass. 1939), affd, 306 U.S. 621 (1939).
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promotion or restriction of religious beliefs, °7 that it was within
the province of the legislatures and school authorities of the
several states to adopt appropriate means to evoke and foster a
sentiment of national unity among the children in the public
schools,"0 ' and that the Court could not exercise censorship over
the conviction of legislatures that a particular program or
exercise will best promote, in the minds of children who attend
the common schools, an attachment to the institutions of their
country, nor overrule the local judgment against granting
exemptions from observance of such a program. 10 9 Justice Stone,
noting that the loyalty, citizenship, and religious sincerity of the
two youths was unquestioned, wrote a sharply worded dissent:
The law which is thus sustained is unique in the history of
Anglo-American legislation. It does more than suppress
freedom of speech and more than prohibit the free exercise of
religion, which concededly are forbidden by the First
Amendment and are violations of the liberty guaranteed by the
Fourteenth. For by this law the state seeks to coerce these
children to express a sentiment which, as they interpret it, they
do not entertain, and which violates their deepest religious
convictions. It is not denied that such compulsion is a
prohibited infringement of personal liberty, freedom of speech
and religion, guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, except in so far as
it may be justified and supported as a proper exercise of the
state's power over public education."
0
Commenting that both parents and the state share a
responsibility to educate children,"' he forcefully defended the
principle that the state cannot compel speech or belief contrary to
religious conviction:
The guaranties [sic] of civil liberty are but guaranties [sic] of
freedom of the human mind and spirit and of reasonable
freedom and opportunity to express them. They presuppose the
right of the individual to hold such opinions as he will and to
give them reasonably free expression, and his freedom, and that
of the state as well, to teach and persuade others by the
communication of ideas. The very essence of the liberty which
they guaranty is the freedom of the individual from compulsion
107 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 (1940).
'1 Id. at 597-98.
109 Id. at 598.
110 Id. at 601 (Stone, J., dissenting).
... Id. at 601-02.
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as to what he shall think and what he shall say, at least where
the compulsion is to bear false witness to his religion. If these
guaranties [sic] are to have any meaning they must, I think, be
deemed to withhold from the state any authority to compel
belief or the expression of it where that expression violates
religious convictions, whatever may be the legislative view of
the desirability of such compulsion.
112
The decision "was excoriated by law journals, the press, and
religious organizations."" 3  Within two years, Justices Black,
Douglas, and Murphy announced that the case was decided
wrongly. 114 The Court overruled Gobitis in 1943,"' with Justice
Jackson pronouncing:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental
rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections."
6
The Court thus vindicated the rights of religious conscience
against the dictates of the state, a result brought about in no
small measure by citizens "who refused to accept the Court's
1940 pronouncements on the meaning of the Constitution,
minority rights, and religious liberty."1 17
D. A Hobbesian Choice: Employment or Religious Conscience
In Sherbert v. Verner,"' Adell Sherbert, a member of the
Seventh-day Adventist Church, was terminated by her South
Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday-
"the Sabbath Day of her faith."" 9  Unable to obtain other
employment because she would not work on Saturday, she filed a
claim for unemployment compensation benefits under the South
112 Id. at 604.
113 FISHER & HARRIGER, supra note 30, at 574.
114 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 643 (1943) (Black, J. &
Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 624 (1942)
(dissenting opinion)).
1'5 Id. at 642 (majority opinion).
116 Id. at 638.
117 FISHER & HARRIGER, supra note 30, at 574.
118 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
9 Id. at 399.
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Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act, which provided that
a claimant is ineligible for benefits if the claimant has failed,
without good cause, to accept available suitable work when
offered. 2 ° The State Commission denied her application on the
ground that she would not accept suitable work when offered,
and the State Supreme Court sustained its action. 121 She then
appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that the statute
abridged her right to the free exercise of her religion, in violation
of the First Amendment, made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 122  Justice Brennan, writing for the
Court, stated that the government may not regulate religious
beliefs, 123 compel affirmation of a repugnant belief,124 or "penalize
or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold
religious views abhorrent to the authorities." 12 ' Finally, it may
not employ the taxing power to inhibit the dissemination of
particular religious views. 26  Remarking that her religiously-
based conduct does not involve any action prohibited by the state,
the Court stated:
If... the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to
withstand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be either
because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no
infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free
exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise
of appellant's religion may be justified by a 'compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's
constitutional power to regulate . '...'127
The Court then goes on to conclude that the state's
disqualification for benefits imposes a burden on the free exercise
of Sherbert's religion.12 The Court remarks that it is not
fostering the 'establishment' of the Seventh-day Adventist
religion in South Carolina, for the extension of unemployment
benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers
reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of
120 Id. at 399-401.
121 Id. at 401.
122 Id. at 403, 409-10.
123 Id. at 402 (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940)).
124 Id. (citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)).
125 Id. (citing Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953)).
126 Id. (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)).
127 Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
128 Id.
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neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not
represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions
which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall. 129
Finally, the Court examined whether there is a "compelling
state interest" that justified burdening Sherbert's free exercise of
religion.'3 ° A majority of the Justices concluded that there is no
such interest. Furthermore, the Justices found that to justify
burdening the free exercise of religion in this situation would
require more than a "showing merely of a rational relationship to
some colorable state interest[;] ... in this highly sensitive
constitutional area, '(o)nly the gravest abuses, endangering
paramount interest, give occasion for permissible limitation.' "131
They concluded that no such danger or abuse has been presented
in this case:
No such abuse or danger has been advanced in the present case.
The appellees suggest no more than a possibility that the filing
of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning
religious objections to Saturday work might not only dilute the
unemployment compensation fund but also hinder the
scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work. But that
possibility is not apposite here because no such objection
appears to have been made before the South Carolina Supreme
Court, and we are unwilling to assess the importance of an
asserted state interest without the views of the state court.
Nor, if the contention had been made below, would the record
appear to sustain it; there is no proof whatever to warrant such
fears of malingering or deceit as those which the respondents
now advance.'3 2
129 Id. at 409. Interestingly enough, Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion,
concludes that the Court's decision does constitute recognition of an establishment of
religion. Id. at 415 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("To require South Carolina to so
administer its laws as to pay public money to the appellant under the circumstances
of this case is thus clearly to require the State to violate the Establishment Clause
as construed by this Court."). Such a "double-barreled dilemma," Id. at 413, has not
gone unnoticed by legal commentators. See FISHER & HARRIGER, supra note 30, at
565 ("These Clauses-the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause-
sometimes overlap and compete. Satisfying one clause may violate the other. If
Congress grants a tax exemption for church property, is that establishment of
religion? Taxing the property, however, would interfere with free exercise.").
130 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (majority opinion).
131 Id. (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
122 Id. at 407.
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Therefore the Court was unmoved by South Carolina's
concern that everyone who does not want to work on Saturday, if
it is a job requirement, will quit and be able to collect
unemployment benefits by claiming to be a Seventh-day
Adventist. 3 3 The Court noted that its decision was in accordance
with many state court opinions that granted benefits to persons
who were physically available for work but unable to find
suitable employment solely because of a religious prohibition
against Saturday work.13 1
This Article next examines a situation in which, for religious
reasons, individuals refuse to send their children to public school
beyond the eighth grade.13
E. The Amish and Public Education Collide
[MIembers of the Old Order Amish religion and the
Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were convicted of
violating Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance law (which
requires a child's school attendance until age 16) by declining to
send their children to public or private school after they had
graduated from the eighth grade.136
The Amish provide informal vocational education to their
children to prepare them for life in the rural Amish
community. 137  They sincerely believe "that high school
attendance [is] contrary to the Amish religion and way of life and
that they would endanger their own salvation and that of their
children by complying with the law."13 The State Supreme Court
sustained their claim that application of the compulsory school
attendance law to them violated their rights under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the state
appealed.'39
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, holding that a state's interest in
universal education is not totally free from a balancing process
13 Id.
Id. at 407 n.7 (citing In re Miller, 91 S.E.2d 241, 245 (N.C. 1956); Swenson v.
Mich. Emp't Sec. Comm'n, 65 N.W.2d 709, 712 (Mich. 1954); Tary v. Bd. of Review,
Bureau of Unemployment Comp., 119 N.E.2d 56, 59 (Ohio 1954)).
135 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209 (1972).
136 Id. at 205.
137 Id. at 205, 211.
138 Id. at 205; see also id. at 209.
139 Id. at 207.
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when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as
those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment, 140 and the traditional interest of parents with
respect to the religious upbringing of their children so long as
they "prepare (them) for additional obligations."4 The Justices
prefaced their decision with a detailed description of the Amish
religious values, way of life, and philosophy of education and how
it relates to the upbringing of their children.1 42  The Court
140 Id. at 207, 214; see also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968).
141 Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
142 Id. at 209-13. Since the Court thought it worthwhile to include such
information in detail in its opinion, it is worth quoting here:
In support of their position, respondents presented as expert witnesses
scholars on religion and education whose testimony is uncontradicted. They
expressed their opinions on the relationship of the Amish belief concerning
school attendance to the more general tenets of their religion, and
described the impact that compulsory high school attendance could have on
the continued survival of Amish communities as they exist in the United
States today. The history of the Amish sect was given in some detail,
beginning with the Swiss Anabaptists of the 16th century who rejected
institutionalized churches and sought to return to the early, simple,
Christian life de-emphasizing material success, rejecting the competitive
spirit, and seeking to insulate themselves from the modern world. As a
result of their common heritage, Old Order Amish communities today are
characterized by a fundamental belief that salvation requires life in a
church community separate and apart from the world and worldly
influence. This concept of life aloof from the world and its values is central
to their faith.
Id. at 209-10.
A related feature of Old Order Amish communities is their devotion to a life
in harmony with nature and the soil, as exemplified by the simple life of
the early Christian era that continued in America during much of our early
national life. Amish beliefs require members of the community to make
their living by farming or closely related activities. Broadly speaking, the
Old Order Amish religion pervades and determines the entire mode of life
of its adherents. Their conduct is regulated in great detail by the Ordnung
or rules, of the church community. Adult baptism, which occurs in late
adolescence, is the time at which Amish young people voluntarily
undertake heavy obligations, not unlike the Bar Mitzvah of the Jews, to
abide by the rules of the church community.
Id. at 210.
Amish objection to formal education beyond the eighth grade is firmly
grounded in these central religious concepts. They object to the high school,
and higher education generally, because the values they teach are in
marked variance with Amish values and the Amish way of life; they view
secondary school education as an impermissible exposure of their children
to a 'worldly' influence in conflict with their beliefs. The high school tends
to emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction,
competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students. Amish
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society emphasizes informal learning-through-doing; a life of 'goodness,'
rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge,
community welfare, rather than competition; and separation from, rather
than integration with, contemporary worldly society.
Id. at 210-11.
Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary to Amish
beliefs, not only because it places Amish children in an environment hostile
to Amish beliefs with increasing emphasis on competition in class work and
sports and with pressure to conform to the styles, manners, and ways of the
peer group, but also because it takes them away from their community,
physically and emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent
period of life. During this period, the children must acquire Amish
attitudes favoring manual work and self-reliance and the specific skills
needed to perform the adult role of an Amish farmer or housewife. They
must learn to enjoy physical labor. Once a child has learned basic reading,
writing, and elementary mathematics, these tratis [sic], skills, and
attitudes admittedly fall within the category of those best learned through
example and 'doing' rather than in a classroom. And, at this time in life,
the Amish child must also grow in his faith and his relationship to the
Amish community if he is to be prepared to accept the heavy obligations
imposed by adult baptism. In short, high school attendance with teachers
who are not of the Amish faith-and may even be hostile to it-interposes a
serious barrier to the integration of the Amish child into the Amish
religious community. Dr. John Hostetler, one of the experts on Amish
society, testified that the modern high school is not equipped, in curriculum
or social environment, to impart the values promoted by Amish society.
Id. at 211-12.
The Amish do not object to elementary education through the first eight
grades as a general proposition because they agree that their children must
have basic skills in the 'three R's' in order to read the Bible, to be good
farmers and citizens, and to be able to deal with non-Amish people when
necessary in the course of daily affairs. They view such a basic education as
acceptable because it does not significantly expose their children to worldly
values or interfere with their development in the Amish community during
the crucial adolescent period. While Amish accept compulsory elementary
education generally, wherever possible they have established their own
elementary schools in many respects like the small local schools of the past.
In the Amish belief higher learning tends to develop values they reject as
influences that alienate man from God.
Id. at 212.
On the basis of such considerations, Dr. Hostetler testified that compulsory
high school attendance could not only result in great psychological harm to
Amish children, because of the conflicts it would produce, but would also, in
his opinion, ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish
church community as it exists in the United States today. The testimony of
Dr. Donald A. Erickson, an expert witness on education, also showed that
the Amish succeed in preparing their high school age children to be
productive members of the Amish community. He described their system of
learning through doing the skills directly relevant to their adult roles in the
Amish community as 'ideal' and perhaps superior to ordinary high school
education. The evidence also showed that the Amish have an excellent
record as law-abiding and generally self-sufficient members of society.
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pointed out that "however strong the State's interest in universal
compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to the exclusion
or subordination of all other interests."143  But, the Court
remarked that "[a] way of life, however virtuous and admirable,
may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation
of education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to
have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be
rooted in religious belief."1 44 The Justices concluded that the
Amish's refusal to send their children to public school beyond the
eighth grade is grounded not in personal preference but rather in
fundamental religious belief.1 45 Thus, the Court concluded, the
burden shifts to the State to prove that "its interest in its system
of compulsory education is so compelling that even the
established religious practices of the Amish must give way. 146
Wisconsin offered two justifications for its system of compulsory
education. To quote, "[S]ome degree of education is necessary to
prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our
open political system if we are to preserve freedom and
independence. Further, education prepares individuals to be
self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society."147
The Court found both justifications wanting. It determined
that Amish education was sufficient to prepare a child for living
in the Amish agrarian society,1 48 and that the Amish's education
did not end at the eighth-grade level, as the State contended, but
rather continued as a vocational education suitable for allowing
the child to flourish in the Amish community. 149 Regarding the
State's contention that the Amish child would be at a
disadvantage if the child left the Amish community with only an
eighth-grade education,150 the Justices countered:
There is nothing in this record to suggest that the Amish
qualities of reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to work
would fail to find ready markets in today's society. Absent some
contrary evidence supporting the State's position, we are
Id. at 212-13.
14 Id. at 215.
144 Id.
141 Id. at 216.
146 Id. at 221.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 222.
141 Id. at 224.
150 Id.
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unwilling to assume that persons possessing such valuable
vocational skills and habits are doomed to become burdens on
society should they determine to leave the Amish faith, nor is
there any basis in the record to warrant a finding that an
additional one or two years of formal school education beyond
the eighth grade would serve to eliminate any such problem
that might exist.151
Thus the Amish were allowed to continue their practice of
withdrawing their children from public education after the
eighth grade as a free exercise of religion. Though the decision
has its critics, 152 when viewed from a Lockean perspective of "civil
harms,"153 it is the correct outcome. Without mentioning Locke,
the Court's decision goes to great lengths to demonstrate that no
"harm" will result from letting the Amish continue their
religiously-based practice of withdrawing their children from
public education after the eighth grade. The same cannot be said
for Employment Division v. Smith,"4 in which the Free Exercise
Clause was unsuccessfully used as a defense to a charge of using
peyote, a hallucinatory drug, as an element of a religious
practice.
F. Drug Use as Religious Exercise
Two men were fired by a private drug rehabilitation
organization because they ingested peyote, a hallucinogenic drug,
for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of their Native American
Church.155 The State of Oregon denied their applications for
unemployment compensation under a state law disqualifying
employees discharged for work-related "misconduct."15 Holding
that the denials violated respondents' First Amendment free
exercise rights, the State Court of Appeals reversed. 57 Though
the decision was affirmed by the State Supreme Court, the U.S.
Supreme Court "vacated the judgment and remanded for a
151 Id. at 224-25.
152 BLAcKFORD, supra note 1, at 161 (stating that Yoder was "wrongly decided").
See also Justice Douglas' comments disagreeing with the Court's conclusion "that
the matter is within the dispensation of parents alone." Yoder, 406 U.S. at 241-43
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
153 See infra Part V.
154 Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
, Id. at 872.
156 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
157 Id.
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determination whether sacramental peyote use is proscribed by
the State's controlled substance law, which makes it a felony to
knowingly or intentionally possess the drug. ' 15 8 Pending that
determination, the Court refused to decide whether such use is
protected by the Constitution.1 59 On remand, the State Supreme
Court held that sacramental peyote use violated, and was not
excepted from, the state law prohibition, but concluded that the
prohibition was invalid under the Free Exercise Clause. '
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Free
Exercise Clause does not relieve an individual of the obligation to
comply with a law that incidentally forbids or requires the
performance of an act that his religious belief forbids or requires
if the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is
otherwise constitutional as applied to those who engage in the
specified act for nonreligious reasons.'61 The Justices further
held that the use of the law could not be evaluated under the
balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner,1 62 whereby
governmental actions that substantially burden a religious
practice must be justified by a "compelling governmental
interest." The Court declared that the balancing test was
"developed in a context-unemployment compensation eligibility
rules-that lent itself to individualized governmental assessment
of the reasons for the relevant conduct. ' 163 The Court found the
test inapplicable to an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a
particular form of conduct. A holding to the contrary, it
concluded, would create an extraordinary right to ignore
generally applicable laws that are not supported by "compelling
governmental interest" on the basis of religious belief. Nor could
such a right be limited to situations in which the conduct
prohibited is "central" to the individual's religion, since that
would enmesh judges in an impermissible inquiry into the
centrality of particular beliefs or practices of a faith.'64
158 Id.
159 Id.
" Id. at 876.
161 Id. at 878-79 (citing Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95
(1940)); id. at 879 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)); see
also supra Parts LV.C, IV.A.
162 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); see also supra Part IV.D.
16 Emp't Div., 494 U.S. at 873.
164 Id. at 886 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, commented that the
application of the "compelling interest" test, if it "is to be applied
at all," must be
applied across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously
commanded. Moreover, if "compelling interest" really means
what it says (and watering it down here would subvert its rigor
in the other fields where it is applied), many laws will not meet
the test. Any society adopting such a system would be courting
anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the
society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to
coerce or suppress none of them. Precisely because "we are a
cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every
conceivable religious preference," and precisely because we
value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford
the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the
religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not
protect an interest of the highest order.165
He continued by reciting a litany of laws that would require
constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic
obligations of all kinds, including compulsory military service, 166
the payment of taxes,167 health and safety regulations such as
manslaughter and child neglect laws, 68 compulsory vaccination
laws, 169 child labor laws,' 70 and animal cruelty laws. 1 '
He concluded by asserting that a legislative exemption for
use of peyote is always available but not constitutionally
required." 2  Indeed, in response to this decision, the U.S.
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
165 Id. at 888 (citation omitted).
'6 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
167 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
1' Funkhouser v. State, 763 P.2d 695 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).
169 Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816 (Ark. 1964).
170 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
171 Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888-89 (1990) (referencing Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1989)).
Ironically, three years later the High Court would invalidate the City of Hialeah's
prohibition against certain types of animal slaughter on free exercise grounds. See
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); infra
Part IV.G.
172 Emp't Div., 494 U.S. at 890. Following up on the Court's suggestion, in 1994
Congress passed legislation legalizing the use of peyote by Native Americans for
ceremonial purposes. FISHER & HARRIGER, supra note 30, at 588-89; see
42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2012) ("No Indian shall be penalized or discriminated
against on the basis of such use ... including ... [the] denial of otherwise applicable
benefits under public assistance programs.").
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("RFRA"),173 which provided "that governments may substantially
burden a person's religious exercise only if they demonstrate a
compelling interest and use the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest."174  But RFRA did not survive
constitutional muster. In City of Boerne v. Flores,175 the High
Court "ruled that Congress [had] exceeded the scope of its
enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment in enacting [the law],"176 and in Gonzales v. 0 Centro
Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,177 the Court held that
RFRA applies only to the federal government.
One commentator has declared that Smith is "exactly as
Locke would have advocated, that religious beliefs could not
ground a constitutional exemption from neutral laws of general
application."'7 8  He maintains that the "same law that applied
inside the church applied equally outside it," and that the Court's
opinion is "fully in line with Locke's views in A Letter concerning
Toleration."'79 He argues:
While the secular state may not, without some (very) compelling
secular reason, establish, endorse, persecute, or disparage
religions, it does none of these things if it simply gives religious
individuals and groups the same benefits (such as police
protection) as anyone else. The same applies if it subjects them
to the same burdens, such as taxes of various kinds and the
generality of the criminal law.
180
The writer concludes that perhaps Oregon's law was too
broad and that the legislature should have taken a "narrower
approach-for example, it could exempt small doses, require
173 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4 (2012).
114 See FISHER & HARRIGER, supra note 30, at 588.
175 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (affirming denial of a church's request for a building
permit to expand its property in a historic district). In response to this decision,
Congress passed "Son of RFRA," Religious Land Use And Institutionalized Persons
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803, that "offers religious groups
protection in land-use disputes, such as [the] zoning issues" involved in Flores. See
FISHER & HARRIGER, supra note 30, at 589.
176 FISHER & HARRIGER, supra note 30, at 589.
177 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
178 BLACKFORD, supra note 1, at 96.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 96-97.
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licensing, or restrict availability to minors." '' After the decision,
Congress enacted legislation that legalized the use of peyote by
Native Americans for ceremonial purposes.18 2
G. Animal Sacrifice as Religious Practice
While Smith involved neutral laws of general applicability,
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah8 3 concerned
municipal ordinances directly aimed at prohibiting a particular
religious practice that the authorities found repugnant and
distasteful. It is to this case that this Article now turns.
The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye practiced the
Santeria religion, which employs animal sacrifice as one of its
principal forms of devotion.8 The animals are killed by cutting
their carotid arteries, and are cooked and eaten following all
Santeria rituals except healing and death rites.185  After the
Church leased land in the city of Hialeah and announced plans to
establish a house of worship and other facilities there, the city
council held an emergency public session and passed many
enactments and resolutions, one of which noted city residents'
"concern" over religious practices inconsistent with public morals,
peace, or safety, and declared the city's "commitment" to
prohibiting such practices."8 6 Other ordinances incorporated
Florida's animal cruelty laws and broadly punished
"[w]hoever... unnecessarily or cruelly.., kills any animal," and
has been interpreted to reach killings for religious reasons; one
that defined "'sacrifice' as 'to unnecessarily kill ... an animal in
a... ritual.., not for the primary purpose of food consumption,'
and prohibited [the] . . .'possess [ion] [,] .. .slaughter[] or
sacrifice[]'" of an animal if it is killed in "any type of ritual," and
there is an intent to use it for food, but exempted any "licensed
[food] establishment[]" if the killing is otherwise permitted by
law."8 7 Another ordinance prohibited the sacrifice of animals,
and defined "sacrifice" in the same manner as the prior
ordinance; yet another defined "slaughter" as "the killing of
181 Id. at 97.
182 See 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b)(1) (2012).
183 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
184 Id. at 524.
185 Id. at 525.
186 Id. at 526, 535.
187 Id. at 526-28 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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animals for food" and prohibited slaughter outside of areas zoned
for slaughterhouses, but included an exemption for "small
numbers of hogs and/or cattle" when exempted by state law.' 8
The Church filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations
of their rights under, among other things, the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment." 9 Although acknowledging that
the foregoing ordinances are not religiously neutral, the District
Court ruled for the city, concluding, among other things, that
compelling governmental interests in preventing public health
risks and cruelty to animals fully justified the absolute
prohibition on ritual sacrifice accomplished by the ordinances,
and that an exception to that prohibition for religious conduct
would unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental
interest, because any more narrow restrictions would be
unenforceable as a result of the Santeria religion's secret nature.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. 9 °
By a unanimous vote, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.1 91 It
prefaced its ruling with a description of the history, background,
and tenets of the Santeria religion. 192 The opinion, delivered
188 Id. at 528 (internal quotation marks omitted).
189 Id.
190 Id. at 530.
191 Id. at 524.
192 Id. at 524-25. Since the Court thought it worthwhile to include such
information in its opinion, it is worth quoting here:
This case involves practices of the Santeria religion, which originated in the
19th century. When hundreds of thousands of members of the Yoruba
people were brought as slaves from western Africa to Cuba, their
traditional African religion absorbed significant elements of Roman
Catholicism. The resulting syncretion, or fusion, is Santeria, "the way of
the saints." The Cuban Yoruba express their devotion to spirits, called
orishas, through the iconography of Catholic saints, Catholic symbols are
often present at Santeria rites, and Santeria devotees attend the Catholic
sacraments.
Id. at 524.
The Santeria faith teaches that every individual has a destiny from God, a
destiny fulfilled with the aid and energy of the orishas. The basis of the
Santeria religion is the nurture of a personal relation with the orishas, and
one of the principal forms of devotion is an animal sacrifice. The sacrifice of
animals as part of religious rituals has ancient roots. Animal sacrifice is
mentioned throughout the Old Testament and it played an important role
in the practice of Judaism before destruction of the second Temple in
Jerusalem. In modern Islam, there is an annual sacrifice commemorating
Abraham's sacrifice of a ram in the stead of his son.
Id. at 524-25 (citations omitted).
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principally by Justice Kennedy, began by delivering a rebuke to
the Hialeah City Fathers:
Our review confirms that the laws in question were enacted by
officials who did not understand, failed to perceive, or chose to
ignore the fact that their official actions violated the Nation's
essential commitment to religious freedom. The challenged
laws had an impermissible object; and in all events the principle
of general applicability was violated because the secular ends
asserted in defense of the laws were pursued only with respect
to conduct motivated by religious beliefs.
19 3
The Court continued by describing the Santeria religion, the
arrival of the Church of Lukumi in Hialeah and their efforts to
secure the necessary licenses and permits to operate, the "great
concern regarding the possibility of public ritualistic animal
sacrifices" expressed by residents, 94 the actions of the City
Council in passing numerous resolutions regarding animal
sacrifice, and the proceedings in the District Court and Court of
Appeals. 195 It presented the general proposition that a law which
According to Santeria teaching, the orishas are powerful but not immortal.
They depend for survival on the sacrifice. Sacrifices are performed at birth,
marriage, and death rites, for the cure of the sick, for the initiation of new
members and priests, and during an annual celebration. Animals sacrificed
in Santeria rituals include chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea pigs,
goats, sheep, and turtles. The animals are killed by the cutting of the
carotid arteries in the neck. The sacrificed animal is cooked and eaten,
except after healing and death rituals.
Id. at 525.
Santeria adherents faced widespread persecution in Cuba, so the religion
and its rituals were practiced in secret. The open practice of Santeria and
its rites remains infrequent. The religion was brought to this Nation most
often by exiles from the Cuban revolution. The District Court estimated
that there are at least 50,000 practitioners in South Florida today.
Id. (citations omitted).
193 Id. at 524.
194 Id. at 525-27. It must be noted that the city and the courts below never
questioned the sincerity of the Church to conduct animal sacrifices for religious
reasons. Id. at 531. It is well to remember that animal sacrifices are not unique to
the Santeria religion. As Justice Kennedy points out, the Old Testament is replete
with animal sacrifices. Id. at 524-25 (citing 14 ENCYCLOPAEDIA JUDAICA 600, 600-
05 (1971)); see also Werblosky & Wigoder, supra note 59, at 338.
",' Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 526-30. The district
court concluded that compelling governmental interests "fully justify the absolute
prohibition on ritual sacrifice" accomplished by the ordinances. Id. at 530 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 723 F. Supp. 1467, 1487 (S.D. Fla. 1989)). The Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. Id. (citing Church
of Lukumi v. City of Hialeah, 936 F.2d 586, 586 (11th Cir. 1991)).
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is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a
compelling governmental interest even if the law has the
incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. 196
The Court remarked that neutrality and general applicability are
interrelated, and "failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely
indication that the other has not been satisfied.' 9 7 Moreover, a
"law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored
to advance that interest."'19  The Court determined that the
ordinances under review failed to satisfy the requirements under
Smith.199
After reviewing the record that led to the passage of the
many ordinances the city passed once the city realized Santeria
was going to operate within its borders, the Court concluded that
the ordinances were passed specifically to target the Church:
The record in this case compels the conclusion that suppression
of the central element of the Santeria worship service was the
object of the ordinances. First, though use of the words
"sacrifice" and "ritual" does not compel a finding of improper
targeting of the Santeria religion, the choice of these words is
support for our conclusion. There are further respects in which
the text of the city council's enactments discloses the improper
attempt to target Santeria. Resolution 87-66, adopted June 9,
1987, recited that "residents and citizens of the City of Hialeah
have expressed their concern that certain religions may propose
to engage in practices which are inconsistent with public
morals, peace or safety," and "reiterate [d]" the city's
commitment to prohibit "any and all [such] acts of any and all
religious groups." No one suggests, and on this record it cannot
be maintained, that city officials had in mind a religion other
than Santeria. 20 0
Although the Court conceded that the purpose of the
ordinances could be unrelated to religious animosity-for
example, the suffering or mistreatment of sacrificed animals and
health hazards from improper disposal-it nevertheless decided
that their design was to accomplish a "religious gerrymander," an
190 Id. at 531 (citing Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)); see supra Part
IV.F.
197 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., 508 U.S. at 531.
198 Id. at 531-32.
199 Id. at 532.
200 Id. at 534-35 (alteration in original).
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impermissible attempt to target the Santeria religion and its
religious practices. 2 1  Examining a definition of "sacrifice"
provided by one of the ordinances, the Justices determined that
"[t]he definition excludes almost all killings of animals except for
religious sacrifice, and the primary purpose requirement narrows
the proscribed category even further, in particular by exempting
kosher slaughter. 20 2  Deciding not to consider whether
differential treatment of two religions is itself an independent
constitutional violation, the Court commented:
It suffices to recite this feature of the law as support for our
conclusion that Santeria alone was the exclusive legislative
concern. The net result of the gerrymander is that few if any
killings of animals are prohibited other than Santeria sacrifice,
which is proscribed because it occurs during a ritual or
ceremony and its primary purpose is to make an offering to the
orishas [(spirits)], not food consumption. Indeed, careful
drafting ensured that, although Santeria sacrifice is prohibited,
killings that are no more necessary or humane in almost all
other circumstances are unpunished. °3
After reviewing the remaining ordinances and determining
that they specifically targeted the Santeria religion, and
referencing the public comments directed against it, the Court
determined that they were not neutral:
In sum, the neutrality inquiry leads to one conclusion: The
ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion. The
pattern we have recited discloses animosity to Santeria
adherents and their religious practices; the ordinances by their
own terms target this religious exercise; the texts of the
ordinances were gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious
killings of animals but to exclude almost all secular killings;
and the ordinances suppress much more religious conduct than
is necessary in order to achieve the legitimate ends asserted in
their defense. These ordinances are not neutral, and the court
below committed clear error in failing to reach this
conclusion. °4
201 Id. at 535 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n of
N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
202 Id. at 536.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 542.
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The Court next turned to the second requirement of the Free
Exercise Clause-that is, that laws burdening religious practice
must be of general applicability. After finding that the
ordinances are underinclusive with regard to promoting public
health and preventing cruelty to animals, °5 it held:
[Elach of Hialeah's ordinances pursues the city's governmental
interests only against conduct motivated by religious belief.
The ordinances "ha[ve] every appearance of a prohibition that
society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshippers] but
not upon itself." This precise evil is what the requirement of
general applicability is designed to prevent.20 6
With the Court finding that Hialeah's ordinances violated
the free exercise rights of the adherents of the Santeria religion,
they were allowed to practice their faith in the manner they have
been doing for many years. One observer maintains that this
case is an example of religious persecution 207 and believes it,
along with Smith, was "correctly decided."20 ' In his view, there is
no doubt that the case is about suppressing sacrifices to the
orishas (spirits), and so it is far removed from Locke's example of
a permissible law forbidding all slaughter of cattle in a
jurisdiction to allow stocks to recover after a plague-a secular
purpose not associated with religious reasons.20 9
H. Hobby Lobby: Religious Conscience Clashes with
Government-Mandated Contraceptive Funding
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, the Supreme Court ruled
that as applied to closely held corporations, the Department of
Health & Human Services ("HHS") regulations imposing the
contraceptive mandate violated RFRA.21 ° The "contraception
mandate" results from the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act ("ACA") and related regulations.211  Under rules
effectively written by an entity called the "Institute of Medicine,"
corporations like Hobby Lobby had to purchase employee health
205 Id. at 543-45.
206 Id. at 545-46 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (citing Florida Star v.
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
207 See BLACKFORD, supra note 1, at 98.
208 Id. at 99.
209 Id. at 98 (citing LOCKE, supra note 8, at 42).
210 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).
211 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
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insurance plans that included coverage for "[a]ll Food and Drug
Administration [(FDA)] approved contraceptive methods,
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling"--
including so-called emergency contraceptives such as Plan B and
Ella-" 'for all women with reproductive capacity,' as prescribed
by a provider."21 2 This is known as the "contraception mandate,"
and it permitted no exception for individuals like the owners of
Hobby Lobby, "who believe that supporting the use of certain
contraceptives is morally reprehensible and contrary to God's
word."213 If their company refused to submit to the offending
regulations, it would have been "subject to a 'regulatory tax'-a
penalty or fine-that [would have] amount[ed]" to a substantial
sum that would have rapidly destroyed their business and the
jobs that went with them.21 4
The controversy arose because, although the law exempts
"religious employer[s]" from the contraceptive mandate, 21 5 it
applied to for-profit companies like Hobby Lobby even though
they are completely owned by very few individuals. Therefore,
the question became: Do for-profit companies have rights under
the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA?216 The Circuits had split on
the issue, with the Tenth Circuit holding they did 217 and the
Third Circuit holding they did not,218 with one dissenting judge
agreeing with the Tenth Circuit.21 9  The Supreme Court
answered in the affirmative. HHS argued that companies could
not sue because they are for-profit corporations, and their owners
212 Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed.
Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, 45 C.F.R.
pt. 147).
213 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec'y of the U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Servs., 724 F.3d 377, 392 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
214 Id. "The exemptions encompass 'grandfathered' plans, which are plans that
were in existence on March 23, 2010, see 45 C.F.R. § 147.140 and 'religious
employers,' see 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B). Additionally, the ACA requirement
to provide employer sponsored health insurance to employees is entirely inapplicable
to employers that have fewer than 50 employees. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a),
(c)(2)(A)." Id. at 392 n.4.
222 See 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv)(B) (2014). Religious organizations are
usually non-profit 501(c)(3) organizations.
216 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4 (2012).
217 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 2013).
218 Conestoga, 724 F.3d at 381.
219 See id. at 389 (Jordan, J., dissenting).
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could not sue because the regulations apply only to the
companies. 22' The High Court rejected this argument noting that
such a reading of the law would "leave merchants with a difficult
choice: give up the right to seek judicial protection of their
religious liberty or forgo [sic] the benefits of operating as
corporations."221 It maintained that RFRA's text shows that
Congress intended the statute to provide very broad protection
for religious liberty, never intending to put merchants to such a
choice. The Court said that congressional drafters employed
the familiar legal fiction of including corporations within
RFRA's definition of "persons," but the purpose of extending
rights to corporations is to protect the rights of people
associated with the corporation, including shareholders, officers,
and employees. Protecting the free-exercise rights of closely
held corporations thus protects the religious liberty of the
humans who own and control them.222
The Court commented that nothing in RFRA suggests a
congressional intent to depart from the Dictionary Act definition
of "person," which "include[s] corporations,.... as well as
individuals,"223 and noted that it had entertained RFRA and free
exercise claims brought by nonprofit corporations.224 It rejected
the notion that for-profit corporations cannot exercise religion,
remarking, "The corporate form alone cannot explain it because
RFRA indisputably protects nonprofit corporations. And the
profit-making objective of the corporations cannot explain it
because the Court has entertained the free-exercise claims of
individuals who were attempting to make a profit as retail
merchants."225 It mentioned that "[biusiness practices compelled
or limited by the tenets of a religious doctrine fall comfortably
220 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2755 (2014).
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)).
224 Id. (citing Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal, 546
U.S. 418 (2006) (describing that after the government seized a shipment of
sacramental tea containing a Schedule 1 substance, the Court held that it failed to
meet its burden under RFRA that barring the substance served a compelling
government interest)).
225 Id. at 2756 (citing Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to a Pennsylvania law forbidding the sale of various retail
products on Sunday)).
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within the understanding of the 'exercise of religion.' "226 It also
declared that the case of Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super
Market of Massachusetts, Inc. ,227 suggested for-profit corporations
could exercise religion.
The Court pointed out that the contraceptive mandate
required Hobby Lobby owners to engage in conduct that seriously
violated their sincere religious belief that life begins at
conception, and that if they and their company refused to provide
contraceptive coverage, they could face economic consequences of
about $475 million annually.228
The Justices next addressed HHS's argument that "the
connection between what the objecting parties must do and the
end that they find to be morally wrong is too attenuated because
it is the employee who will choose the coverage and contraceptive
method she uses."229 The High Court replied:
RFRA's question is whether the mandate imposes a substantial
burden on the objecting parties' ability to conduct business in
accordance with their religious beliefs. The belief of the Hahns
[(Hobby Lobby owners)] ... implicates a difficult and important
question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the
circumstances under which it is immoral for a person to perform
an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of
enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by
another. It is not for the Court to say that the religious beliefs
of the plaintiffs are mistaken or unreasonable.23 °
The Court stated that its "'narrow function... is to
determine' whether the plaintiffs' asserted religious belief
reflect[ed] 'an honest conviction,' and there is no dispute here
that it does."231
226 Id. (citing Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)); see supra Part
IV.F.
227 366 U.S. 617, 618, 627-28 (1961) (holding that a kosher butcher store had to
abide by state law preventing the store from selling on Sunday because the
legislative history of the law was civil, not religious, since it protected the public by
guaranteeing one day in seven to provide a period of rest and quiet, thereby
promoting the health, peace, and good order of society).
228 Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2757.
229 Id.
230 Id. (citing Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707,
716 (1981) (holding that the denial of unemployment benefits to a member of
Jehovah's Witnesses whose religious beliefs prevented him from participating in
weapons production violated his First Amendment rights)).
21 Id. (citation omitted).
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Finally, the Court concluded that although the interest in
guaranteeing cost-free access to the challenged contraceptive
methods was a compelling governmental interest, the
Government had "failed to show that the contraceptive mandate
is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest."
2 32
Furthermore, it reasoned that "[t]he Government ha[d] failed to
satisfy RFRA's least-restrictive-means standard" because "HHS
ha[d] not shown that it lack[ed] other means of achieving its
desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the
exercise of religion[;] ... [for example,] [t]he Government
could.., assume the cost of providing" the contraceptive
coverage objected to by Hobby Lobby.233 Thus, the Court gave
greater weight to genuinely held religious beliefs over a
government mandate.
IV. THE LOCKEAN MODEL
John Locke (1632-1704) was a theorist of church-state
relations who wrote in a time of political struggle between the
temporal and divine realms. He was "enormously influential, far
beyond his own time, and was closely studied by American
intellectuals of the following century. '234 In A Letter Concerning
Toleration, he set forth his views on the functions and purposes
of church and state.
He was a social contract theorist, arguing that "men and
women enter into social arrangements for mutual assistance and
defense-against, for example, [rape], fraud, and foreign
invasions."235 It is the role of government to protect citizens from
these things.236 Locke believed the state should concern itself
with "'civil interests,' which he defines as 'Life, Liberty, Health,
and Indolency of the Body; and the possession of outward things
such as Money, Lands, Houses, Furniture, and the like.' ",237 He
says the state should provide protection for "things belonging to
this Life" and not be concerned with the "Salvation of Souls.
2 38
232 Id.
233 Id. at 2757-58.
234 BLACKFORD, supra note 1, at 39.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 39-40 (citing LOCKE, supra note 8, at 49-51).
237 Id.
228 Id. at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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His background was that of a Protestant Christian, and his
reasons for limiting the role of the state to protecting worldly
things were:
God has not granted power over religion to the ruler, and the
right to seek their own means of salvation is not something that
citizens would give up to join in the social contract;.., the kind
of coercive force available to a secular ruler is inadequate to
compel belief;... taking on such a task would entail that sous
be saved only in countries where the state enforces the correct
religion.
239
In "contrast with the state, Locke thought, a church is a free
and voluntary society aimed at worship of God and the salvation
of [souls]. "240 Accordingly, he proposed a functional separation
between church and state: "The state should act [only] for
entirely secular reasons, and should be in that sense neutral
toward the different religious sects and churches."2 4 ' In his view,
diversity of religious opinion was unavoidable but benign.
Rivalry between religious sects can be avoided, he argued, by
adopting a model of the independence of the state from religion.
Thus the state exists and acts for reasons that are entirely
secular.2 42 If the state is independent of religion, religious sects
will become more moderate if they are allowed to go about their
business without fear of persecution.24 3 Locke understood that
for many people, religious doctrines are so important that they
trump loyalty to the state.2 44 Consequently, an astute public
policy would avoid pushing citizens too far. The state lacks
legitimate power to demand that its citizens adhere to certain
religious beliefs, Locke argued. 24 5  At best it can compel the
appearance of religious conformity.2 46 Even the Roman Empire
could not compel Christians to worship their gods, 24 ' and more
than two hundred years after the founding of Christianity, under
239 Id. (citing LOCKE, supra note 8, at 26-28).
240 Id. (citing LOCKE, supra note 8, at 28).
241 Id.
242 Id. at 40-41.
243 Id. at 41.
244 Id. at 42.
245 Id.
246 Id. at 43.
247 See DAVID POTTER, EMPERORS OF ROME: THE STORY OF IMPERIAL ROME
FROM JULIUS CAESAR TO THE LAST EMPEROR 128-29 (2007).
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Emperor Gallienus, granted them freedom of worship.2 41
Throughout history, many different states have existed
worshipping many different gods. All of them provided peace and
security and protection of life and property. Clearly they all
could not have been serving the true religion.249 Thus it appears
that the success of the state is unrelated to which god or gods it
worships, and so Locke concludes that the state should allow its
citizens to pursue whatever religious goals and objectives they
desires as long as the goals and objectives do not produce civil
harms. 2 If the state does prohibit or require certain actions-no
infanticide or human sacrifice or multiple spouses-it should do
so for secular reasons, not religious ones.251
Accordingly, "the Lockean Model tends to separate the
reasons for state action, not only from religious morality but also
from any traditional morality that does not actually assist in the
protection of worldly things."2 2  In A Letter Concerning
Toleration, Locke does not provide for religious accommodations
to laws of general applicability, but one commentator believes his
model in principle does not rule them out.28 No doubt Locke
would agree that under the "no civil harm" principle, the
decisions in Cantwell, Barnett, Sherbert, and Yoder were correct
because they involved minimal "harm." He would also agree that
Reynolds, Smith, Hobby Lobby, and Church of the Lukumi
Babalu involved major harms because they deal with religious
persecution.Locke viewed religion and conscience as protected by
the relatively narrow confines given to the state-that is, it must
deal only in worldly things, not in the hereafter.254 Thus, if the
state gave an order to embrace a religion or join in its
ceremonies, refusal is justified.255  But if the state gave a
248 Id. at 164. In theocracies, religious citizens control the state and may or may
not demand adherence to their religious doctrines. See generally LILA PERL,
THEOCRACY: POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD (2007).
249 BLACKFORD, supra note 1, at 44.
250 Id. at 45.
251 Id. at 49 (citing LOCKE, supra note 8, at 41-42).
252 Id. at 54.
25 Id. at 49.
254 Id. at 51.
255 Id. One is reminded of the Maccabean revolt that resulted when the Jews
were ordered to participate in a sacrifice to Zeus. They responded by murdering the
Syrian commissioner and raising the standard of rebellion. See generally WARREN
MATTHEWS, WORLD RELIGIONS (7th ed. 2013).
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command for the public good in matters strictly of worldly
concern, under the Lockean model, the command must be obeyed
even if it goes against conscience.256
CONCLUSION
Given the reasonableness of the Lockean Model that holds
that the state should allow all religions to pursue their own goals
so long as they do not produce civil harms, legislators and judges
should be mindful of it when crafting legislation and rendering
decisions.
However, although we live in a secular age, it is worthwhile
to be attentive to the principle that a society with no moral
grounding as is usually found in religion, can be cast adrift, to be
buffeted by whatever fads or trends are popular at the time.
Such a society can lose its ethical moorings, and in times of
stress, easily disintegrate.
While the Free Exercise Clause was intended to protect
religious conscience and action from the dictates of government,
in an increasingly secular age, a country whose citizens have no
religion or any sense of connectedness to some higher purpose is
an impoverished nation that cannot long endure, and a
government that disparages religion257  is unwittingly
contributing to its own demise.
256 BLACKFORD, supra note 1, at 51.
257 See generally CARTER, supra note 80.
